

# KW45\_K32W1\_2P43C

## Mask Set Errata



# Mask Set Errata for Mask 2P43C

## Revision History

This report applies to mask 2P43C for these products:

- KW45\_K32W1
- KW45Z410x3AFxBx
- KW45Z410x2AFxBx
- KW45B41Zx3AFxBx
- KW45B41Zx2AFxBx
- K32W1480VFTBT

Table 1. Revision History

Revision	Date	Significant Changes
1.4	12/2022	Initial Revision

## Errata and Information Summary

Table 2. Errata and Information Summary

Erratum ID	Erratum Title
<a href="#">ERR051051</a>	Core: A partially completed VLLDM might leave Secure floating-point data unprotected
<a href="#">ERR050505</a>	Core: Access permission faults are prioritized over unaligned Device memory faults
<a href="#">ERR050501</a>	Core: DFSR.EXTERNAL is not set correctly when waking up from sleep
<a href="#">ERR050502</a>	Core: Execution priority might be wrong for one cycle after AIRCR is changed
<a href="#">ERR050500</a>	Core: Group priority of a Non-secure interrupt might be incorrect when AIRCR.PRIS is set
<a href="#">ERR050503</a>	Core: Non-secure HardFault exception might preempt when disabled by AIRCR.BFHFNMINIS
<a href="#">ERR050504</a>	Core: Sorting of pending interrupts might be wrong when high latency IRQs are pending
<a href="#">ERR050810</a>	I3C: t(CPB) & t(CPSr) , t(CASr) parameter different from standard
<a href="#">ERR051120</a>	I3C: The Not Acknowledge Error bit in the Master Errors and Warnings register (MERRWARN[NACK]) is not set when slave does not acknowledge High Data Rate - Double Data Rate (HDR-DDR) read.
<a href="#">ERR050811</a>	I3C: tSU_STO and tSU_STA do not met for I3C legacy mode Fm+
<a href="#">ERR051118</a>	LPI2C: Aborting a multiple byte receive transfer will cause subsequent transfer to hang
<a href="#">ERR051119</a>	LPI2C: NACK Detect Flag can be set when IGNACK=1
<a href="#">ERR051136</a>	Read Stall: flash read/write operation causes error during program/erase
<a href="#">ERR051135</a>	RF RAM Retention increases power consumption in Power Down modes

# Known Errata

## ERR051135: RF RAM Retention increases power consumption in Power Down modes

### Description

When the RF RAM is retained by using the RF\_CMC[RAM\_PWR] registers in Power Down mode, the power consumption is around 2uA higher than when using Deep Sleep mode.

### Workaround

Turn off the RF RAM manually using the RF\_CMC[RAM\_PWR] registers before entering in Power Down modes.

## ERR051119: LPI2C: NACK Detect Flag can be set when IGNACK=1

### Description

When MCFG1[IGNACK] is set any received NACK should be ignored, but under some conditions the NACK Detect Flag (NDF) can still be set.

However, the LPI2C will not automatically generate a STOP or Repeated START if the NACK Detect Flag is set when IGNACK=1 and the transfer will continue as if the NDF had not been set.

The LPI2C will continue to block a new START condition if the NDF is set.

### Workaround

When IGNACK=1, the NDF must be cleared by software to allow new I2C transfers to start.

## ERR050505: Core: Access permission faults are prioritized over unaligned Device memory faults

### Description

Cortex-M33 1080541-C :

A load or store which causes an unaligned access to Device memory will result in an UNALIGNED UsageFault exception. However, if the region is not accessible because of the MPU access permissions (as specified in MPU\_RBAR.AP), then the resulting MemManage fault will be prioritized over the UsageFault.

### Workaround

There is no workaround.

However, it is expected that no existing software is relying on this behavior since it was permitted in Armv7-M.

## ERR050503: Core: Non-secure HardFault exception might preempt when disabled by AIRCR.BFHFNMINs

### Description

Cortex-M33 1453380-C:

When the processor implements the Security Extension and AIRCR.BFHFNMINs is 1, the Non-secure banked version of SHCSR.HARDFaultPENDED can be set to 1. This Non-secure pended HardFault might not preempt per architecture because it does not have enough priority (that is, the processor is in HardFault handler mode). If AIRCR.BFHFNMINs is subsequently changed to 0 with the Non-secure HardFault still pending, then the architecture requires that the Nonsecure HardFault should

never preempt regardless of execution priority. Because of this erratum, the pended Non-secure HardFault exception preempts when AIRCR.BFHFNMIN is 0 and current execution priority is larger than -1 (Non-secure HardFault having higher priority).

#### Workaround

There is no workaround for this erratum.

### ERR051136: Read Stall: flash read/write operation causes error during program/erase

#### Description

The Program Flash Controller (PFC) provides access to the flash memory from the AHB bus masters. If a master does a flash memory access to a flash array while that array is busy, the access is terminated with an AHB bus error. The PFC implements an optional "flash read stall" mechanism to avoid this situation. This mechanism is enabled by a control bit in the Secure Miscellaneous System Control Module (SMSCM). If enabled, the flash read stall logic will hold any flash memory access to a flash array while that array is busy. The access will "stall" (be held in its AHB bus data phase) until the target flash array is not busy. Once the busy flag has been negated, the access will be complete.

This device has a PFC for the primary flash attached to the main processor and a PFC for the flash in the radio subsystem. The primary flash and the radio subsystem flash each have three flash arrays - a main program flash array, an IFR flash array, and an IFR1 flash array. Each PFC can access the three flash arrays of its attached flash. The flash read stall should work for access to any of these arrays. Due to a logic error, the flash read stall mechanism only works correctly for accesses to a busy program flash array. Even when the flash read stall mechanism is enabled, access to busy IFR or IFR1 flash arrays is not stalled and terminates with an AHB bus error.

#### Workaround

Do not access IFR or IFR1 flash arrays when they may be busy due to a flash erase or program operation. When performing Flash erase/program operations, execute from SRAM or ROM.

### ERR050501: Core: DFSR.EXTERNAL is not set correctly when waking up from sleep

#### Description

Cortex-M33 1367266-C:

An external debug event which causes the processor to enter Debug state or the debug monitor should set DFSR.EXTERNAL. It has been found that this field is not set if the event occurs while the processor is asleep.

#### Workaround

There is no workaround.

### ERR050502: Core: Execution priority might be wrong for one cycle after AIRCR is changed

#### Description

Cortex-M33 1435973-C:

AIRCR is used in the NVIC active tree to calculate the execution priority, which in turn is used to determine fault escalation, exception preemption, and other NVIC-related behaviors. When the active tree is pipelined and there are high latency IRQs active, there might be a glitch in the active tree output for one cycle after AIRCR is changed. The glitch results in NVIC producing wrong execution priority that is neither based on the old AIRCR value nor the new one.

#### Workaround

There is no workaround for this erratum.

## ERR051120: I3C: The Not Acknowledge Error bit in the Master Errors and Warnings register (MERRWARN[NACK]) is not set when slave does not acknowledge High Data Rate - Double Data Rate (HDR-DDR) read.

### Description

I3C: The Master Errors and Warnings register (MERRWARN) is used to debug I3C/I2C errors and warnings in Master mode. The MERRWARN[NACK] bit does not set when slave does not accept read while HDR-DDR mode is used. This bit is set to 1 in Single Data Rate (SDR) mode when slave does not acknowledge.

### Workaround

If a slave does not accept HDR-DDR read and master side is not able to debug, the slave availability/readiness can be checked by sending SDR read request. The MERRWARN[NACK] will reflect the slave response.

## ERR050810: I3C: t(CPB) & t(CPSr) , t(CASr) parameter different from standard

### Description

1. tCBP parameter defines the minimum timing for clock before stop Tcbp ( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 122) in I3C push-pull mode and may not meet the value in the standard 17.2ns .

The value observed for FCLK 160MHz is 6.26ns and for 120MHz is 8.34ns respectively .

IMPACT : No Functional Impact .The actual I3C devices are not expected to have any issues at all, as the behavior around STOP is only verifying SCL is High when SDA rises, so plenty of setup time ( tSU\_OD ( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 122) - 3ns) .

2. tCBSr parameter defines the minimum timing for clock before repeated start TCBSr( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 123) in I3C push-pull mode and may not meet the value in the standard 17.2ns .

The value observed for FCLK 160MHz is 9.39ns and for120Mhz is 12.51 ns respectively .

IMPACT : No Functional Impact .For Repeated start The actual behavior of Targets will be to detect that SDA is low on the following SCL Falling edge , for which there is plenty of setup ( tSU\_OD ( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 122) - 3ns) . Even if a Target has an SDA rise detector which checks if SCL is High, there is plenty of setup time ( tSU\_OD ( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 122) - 3ns).

3. tCASr parameter defines the minimum timing for clock after repeated start (tCASr) ( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 123) in I3C push-pull mode and may not meet the value in the standard 17.2ns .

The value observed for FCLK 48MHz is 10.42 ns .

IMPACT : No Functional Impact .For Repeated start The actual behavior of Targets will be to detect that SDA is low on the following SCL Falling edge , for which there is plenty of setup ( tSU\_OD ( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 122) - 3ns) . Even if a Target has an SDA rise detector which checks if SCL is High, there is plenty of setup time ( tSU\_OD ( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 122) - 3ns).

### Workaround

User needs to skip conformance timing checks for tCBP , tCBSr , tCASr

## ERR050811: I3C: tSU\_STO and tSU\_STA do not met for I3C legacy mode Fm+

### Description

Minimum timing for clock before stop tSU\_STO ( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 121) is not met in I3C legacy Fm+ mode . Standard expected minimum 260ns .

For Different FCLKs tSU\_STO observed is in range of (94ns - 125ns )

This conformance violation will not cause functional issue as the behavior around STOP is only verifying SCL is High when SDA rises, so plenty of setup time (tSU\_DAT ( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 121) - 50ns) .

Minimum timing for clock before repeated start tSU\_STA( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 121) is not met in I3C legacy Fm+ mode .  
Standard expected minimum 260ns

For different FCLKs tSU\_STA observed is (92 - 145ns) .

This conformance violation will not cause functional issue as the behavior around Repeated Start is only verifying SCL is High when SDA falls, so plenty of setup time (tSU\_DAT ( I3C Spec V1.1.1 Table 121) - 50ns ) .

#### Workaround

User needs to skip conformance timing checks for tSU\_STA and tSU\_STO.

## ERR050500: Core: Group priority of a Non-secure interrupt might be incorrect when AIRCR.PRIS is set

#### Description

Cortex-M33 1113997-C:

When the processor is configured with Security extension and AIRCR.PRIS is 1, the Armv8-M architecture requires that the priorities of Non-secure interrupts are modified to ensure that Secure interrupts are prioritized over Non-secure interrupts. The Armv8-M architecture requires that lower priority numbers take precedence over higher priority numbers. Because of this erratum, a Non-secure interrupt with higher priority number might be handled in the wrong order compared to another Non-secure or Secure interrupt.

#### Workaround

There is no workaround for this erratum.

## ERR051118: LPI2C: Aborting a multiple byte receive transfer will cause subsequent transfer to hang

#### Description

If the MCFGR0[ABORT] register bit is used to abort a receive transfer that consists of multiple bytes, then the subsequent transfer after the abort completes will hang.

#### Workaround

If MCFGR0[ABORT] is set by software, first wait for the LPI2C to go idle (MSR[MBF] = 0) and then issue a software reset (MCR[RST] = 1) before initiating the next transfer.

## ERR051051: Core: A partially completed VLLDM might leave Secure floating-point data unprotected

#### Description

Arm errata 2219175

Affects: Cortex-M33

Fault Type: Programmer Category B

Fault Status: Present in r0p0, r0p1, r0p2, r0p3, r0p4, r1p0. Open.

The VLLDM instruction allows Secure software to restore a floating-point context from memory. Due to this erratum, if this instruction is interrupted or it faults before it completes, then Secure data might be left unprotected in the floating point register file, including the FPSCR.

**Configurations affected:**

This erratum affects all configurations of the Cortex-M33 processor configured with the Armv8-M Security Extension and the Floating-point Extension.

**Conditions:**

This erratum occurs when all the following conditions are met:

- There is no active floating-point context, (CONTROL.FPCA==0)
- Secure lazy floating-point state preservation is not active, (FPCCR\_S.LSPACT==0)
- The floating-point registers are treated as Secure (FPCCR\_S.TS==1)
- Secure floating-point state needs to be restored, (CONTROL\_S.SFPA == 1)
- Non-secure state is permitted to access to the floating-point registers, (NSACR.CP10 == 1)
- A VLLDM instruction has loaded at least one register from memory and does not complete due to an interrupt or fault

**Implications:**

If the floating-point registers contain Secure data, a VLSTM instruction is usually executed before calling a Non-secure function to protect the Secure data. This might cause the data to be transferred to memory (either directly by the VLSTM or indirectly by the triggering of a subsequent lazy state preservation operation). If the data has been transferred to memory, it is restored using VLLDM on return to Secure state. If the VLLDM is interrupted or it faults before it completes and enters a Non-secure handler, the partial register state which has been loaded will be accessible to Non-secure state.

**Workaround**

To avoid this erratum, software can ensure a floating-point context is active before executing the VLLDM instruction by performing the following sequence:

- Read CONTROL\_S.SFPA
- If CONTROL\_S.SFPA==1 then execute an instruction which has no functional effect apart from causing context creation (such as VMOV S0, S0)

## **ERR050504: Core: Sorting of pending interrupts might be wrong when high latency IRQs are pending**

**Description**

Cortex-M33 1540599-C:

The NVIC contains a pending tree which sorts all pending and enabled interrupts based on priorities. If DHCSR.C\_DEBUGEN and DHCSR.C\_MASKINTS are 1, DHCSR.S\_SDE is 0 and halting debug is allowed, then Nonsecure PendSV, Non-secure SysTick, and Non-secure IRQs should be masked off and they should not affect the sorting of pending and enabled secure interrupts. If multiple high latency IRQs are pending and enabled with different security targets and priorities, then Non-secure IRQs which should be masked off might cause the pending tree output to be a pending Secure interrupt without highest priority. This is because of incorrect masking before doing priority comparisons in the tree.

**Workaround**

There is no workaround for this erratum.

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